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Abstract 
 
Several authors have highlighted the role of intuition in expertise.  In particular, a 
large amount of data has been collected about intuition in expert nursing, and intuition 
plays an important role in the influential theory of nursing expertise developed by 
Benner (1984).  We discuss this theory, and highlight both data that support it and 
data that challenge it.  Based on this assessment, we propose a new theory of nursing 
expertise and intuition, which emphasizes how perception and conscious problem 
solving are intimately related.  In the discussion, we propose that this theory opens 
new avenues of enquiry for research into nursing expertise. 
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Towards an alternative to Benner’s theory of expert intuition in nursing:  
A discussion paper 
 
What is already known about the topic? 
• While the role of intuition in nursing has been the topic of considerable 
debate, studies have established that this is a genuine phenomenon. 
• Definitions of experts’ intuition emphasize five features: rapid perception, lack 
of awareness of the processes engaged, presence of emotions, holistic 
understanding of the situation, and overall good quality of the proposed 
solutions. 
• The literature often refers to Patricia Benner’s theory of nursing expertise, 
which proposes that the road to expertise encompasses five stages. 
 
What this paper adds 
• A detailed discussion of Benner’s theory, which leads to the conclusion that 
the theory is too simple to account for the complex pattern of phenomena that 
recent research on expert intuition has uncovered. 
• A new theory of expert intuition in nursing, which provides mechanisms for 
explaining how intuitive, perceptual decision making is linked to more 
analytical problem solving. 
• The suggestion that standard research on expertise (mostly based on the 
natural sciences) and that on nursing expertise (often based on 
phenomenology) should start a constructive dialogue. 
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Introduction 
Intuition is often proposed as one of the defining characteristics of expertise.  
From chess masters able to understand a position nearly instantaneously, to physicists 
automatically seeing the deep physical implications of a problem, to nurses having a 
gut feeling about the prognosis of a patient, what impresses the bystander is the 
suddenness and nearly magical nature of these behaviours.  While this last 
characteristic has sometimes led critics to doubt the psychological reality of intuition, 
there is currently good evidence that this phenomenon is genuine.  Indeed, empirical 
support comes from several domains including games (De Groot, 1965), sciences 
(Simon, 1995), the military (Klein, 2003), business (Prietula & Simon, 1989), and 
nursing  (e.g., Benner, 1984; Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 1992; McCormack, 1993; 
McCutcheon & Pincombe, 2001; Polge, 1995).  Given the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon, not the least in fields where intuitive decisions may be a matter of life 
or death, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms underpinning it. 
 There are some differences in the way intuition is defined in the literature, but 
there is also a fair degree of agreement in that most definitions include rapid 
perception, lack of awareness of the processes engaged, concomitant presence of 
emotions, and holistic understanding of the problem situation.  It should be noted that 
emotions have long been emphasised as part and parcel of intuition, even in domains 
that may seem to engage only “cold cognitions” such as chess (Tikhomirov & 
Vinogradov, 1970); the key role of emotion in intuition has recently been buttressed 
by investigations with neurological patients showing how the lack of emotions 
negatively affects intuitive decision making (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1997).  To these four features, one can add the idea that intuitions, while not 
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necessarily always correct, must be correct more often than not (De Groot, 1965, 
1992).  This last definitional requirement, which was developed by de Groot so that 
intuition can be seen as an adaptive and rational process yielding behaviour better 
than chance,  implies that novices’ gut feelings are unlikely to count as intuitions.  
The essential role of perception was identified just after World War II by the 
Dutch psychologist Adriaan de Groot in the domain of chess (De Groot, 1965).  He 
hypothesized that the crucial difference between grandmasters and amateurs would be 
in the way they search the maze of possible positions, with grandmasters expected to 
search more deeply and consider more moves.  To test this hypothesis, he collected 
verbal protocols where players had to try to find the best move in an unknown 
position while thinking aloud.  Contrary to his expectations, De Groot found that there 
were only small differences in the structure of search, but that grandmasters, in a 
matter of seconds, were able literally to “see” potentially good moves and grasp the 
meaning of the position.  The importance of perception, even in a game such as chess 
that many would describe as logical and intellectual, was supported by grandmasters’ 
ability to memorize nearly perfectly a position that had been presented for a few 
seconds.  It was also supported later by the detailed analysis of the eye movements of 
strong and weaker chess players looking at a novel position (De Groot & Gobet, 
1996). 
The goal of this paper is not so much to review the extensive literature dealing 
with intuition and expertise in nursing (for pointers to this literature, see Field, 2004; 
King & Appleton, 1997) as to discuss two theories of expert intuition critically.  We 
start by briefly considering the role of intuition in nursing practice.  Then, we discuss 
Benner’s (1984) influential theory, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses.  We 
then argue that the template theory of expertise (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) presents the 
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basis for a theory of expert nursing intuition that explains all the key phenomena.  In 
the discussion, we provide a direct comparison between Benner’s theory and template 
theory. 
Intuition in Nursing Practice 
The role of intuition in nursing has been the topic of considerable debate, with 
some authors (such as English, 1993) considering that this concept should be 
subjected to critical scrutiny at best and rejected at worst, while others (such as 
Darbyshire, 1994; Effken, 2001; King & Appleton, 1997) considering it central to our 
understanding of nursing expertise.  In particular, the work of Patricia Benner and her 
colleagues (Benner, 1984; Benner et al., 1992; Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 1996) has 
done much to convince the field of nursing of the importance of intuition.   
A number of studies have established that intuition in nursing is a genuine 
phenomenon (e.g., Benner, 1984; Benner et al., 1992; McCormack, 1993; 
McCutcheon & Pincombe, 2001; Polge, 1995).  These studies have used methods 
such as group interviews, personal history interviews, surveys, and detailed 
observation, and have often been carried out within the frameworks of grounded 
theory and phenomenology.  A striking characteristic of this research, in comparison 
to research on expertise in general (see for example the contributions in Chi, Glaser, 
& Farr, 1988; and Ericsson, 1996), and a fortiori into medical expertise, is the dearth 
of experimental studies.  While researchers into medical expertise have used standard 
experimental and quantitative methods to study the perception, memory, and decision-
making ability of novice and expert physicians (see for example Norman, Coblentz, 
Brooks, & Babcook, 1992; Patel, Groen, & Arocha, 1990; Rikers et al., 2002), 
researchers into nursing expertise have limited themselves to qualitative methods.  
Whether this reflects only a difference in the general research philosophy of these 
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fields, or whether this is also due to the empirical difficulties of measuring nursing 
intuition per se, remains to be established.  
Benner’s Theory of Skill Acquisition in Nursing 
Benner’s influential theory of nursing expertise closely follows the skill 
acquisition theory developed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986).  It proposes that the 
road from novice to expert nurse encompasses five stages.  In the “novice” stage, 
beginners learn through instruction; they acquire domain-specific facts, features, and 
actions.  An important aspect of this stage is that the rules that novices learn are 
“context-free”; that is, their application ignores the nuances of the situation, which 
results in an inflexible and limited performance.  After a large amount of concrete 
experience within the domain, novices move to the “advanced beginner” stage.  At 
this stage, individuals start to use and make sense of “situational elements,” and 
commence employing overall characteristics of the situation when their previous 
experience makes it possible.  Attributes start to depend on the context.  In the 
“competence” stage, individuals organize their actions in terms of hierarchical long-
range plans.  This stage sees an increased level of efficiency, although planning is still 
conscious, abstract, analytic, and deliberate.  In the “proficiency” stage, situations are 
perceived as wholes rather than as unconnected aspects, and certain features are 
perceived as salient while others ignored.  Thus, proficient individuals can organize 
and understand problem situations intuitively, but still require analytical thinking to 
choose an action.  Finally, in the “expertise” stage, not only the understanding of the 
task, but also the decision of what to do next, is intuitive and fluid.  Given their deep 
understanding of the situation, experts act naturally without explicitly making 
decisions and solving problems.  This is the case at least in routine situations.  Experts 
may revert to analytic thinking—that is, revert to a previous stage—with situations for 
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which they have no experience or in situations in which the “intuitive grasp” turned 
out to be incorrect.  They may also reflect on their whole intuitions and try to improve 
them, a process Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) call “deliberate rationality.”  Benner et 
al. (1996) also emphasized the importance of knowing the patients and of being 
emotionally involved in the development of nursing intuition. While beginners’ 
emotions are characterized by anxiety, which impedes their practice, more advanced 
nurses can rely on a larger repertoire of emotional responses, which they use as 
informative and guiding cues. These cues not only amplify nurses’ perceptual 
awareness, but also shape their clinical know-how, ethical comportment, and 
emotional involvement with patients and their families. 
Strengths of the Theory 
Benner’s theory is simple, and, at least as a first approximation, captures some 
aspects of experts’ development fairly well, in particular the progression from slow 
and hesitant to fast and fluid problem solving behaviour.  It provides important 
insights on the complex interaction between nursing theory and practice.  In addition, 
the role of emotions is emphasized, which is rarely the case in expertise research.  
From an educational point of view, the emphasis on learning in context 
counterbalances the habitual focus on theoretical instruction (English, 1993).  Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that Benner (1984), while mostly using interpretive 
phenomenology as her main tool, also refers to objective measures such as patient 
outcome.   
Weaknesses of the Theory 
In spite of its popularity, Benner’s theory does not account for the 
development of expertise and intuition well, when compared to empirical data.  A key 
aspect of the theory is the presence of stages in expertise development.  However, 
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these stages are poorly documented in the literature, and some of the evidence from 
nursing practice explicitly adduced to support their existence is rather weak.  For 
example, even in Benner’s most extensive empirical study of nursing practice (Benner 
et al., 1996), the criteria used for assigning nurses to stages (number of years of 
experience and supervisors’ judgements) are not reliable and in fact have been shown 
not always to correlate with expertise (Ericsson & Smith, 1991).  Moreover, it is well 
known from research in developmental psychology that empirically establishing the 
reality of stages is a difficult matter, requiring complex mathematics such as 
catastrophe theory (van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992) and a wealth of quantitative 
data, which are lacking in this case.  A related point is that the very status of these 
stages is unclear.  If they are meant to imply that individuals can be categorized 
unequivocally in one stage, then there is plenty of evidence showing that individuals, 
while fluent in one sub-field, may perform much less fluidly in another sub-field of 
the same domain (Rikers et al., 2002).  Indeed, Benner makes this point repeatedly in 
her 1984 book.  But, if the other interpretation is true—that the stages refer to 
behaviours rather than individuals—then the theory loses much of its explanatory 
power.  In particular, discussions of how long it takes to reach a stage (see for 
example Benner, 1984) do not seem to be particularly relevant (see Effken, 2001, and 
English, 1993, for related points). 
 According to the theory, becoming an expert requires that a person’s 
knowledge moves along two dimensions: from explicit to implicit, and from abstract 
to concrete.  We agree that this description accounts for some aspects of expertise, but 
this is only part of the story.  Consider the explicit-implicit dimension.  The theory 
assumes that, in the first stage, learning mostly occurs through explicit instruction; 
however, there is ample evidence in a variety of domains that skills are sometimes 
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learned implicitly, without the mediation of verbal instruction (Johnstone & Shanks, 
2001; Reber, 1993).  Thus, the theory is at best incomplete on this issue.  But the 
theory has difficulties at the other end of the novice-expert range as well.  The list of 
competencies identified by Benner (1984) contains items that clearly require access to 
explicit knowledge.  Among the numerous examples, one can mention: “Providing an 
interpretation of the patient’s condition and giving a rationale for procedures” (p. 86-
89);1  “Getting appropriate and timely responses from physicians” (p. 142); and 
“contingency management: Rapid matching of demands and resources in emergency 
situations” (pp. 113-116).  These competencies relate to explanation, communication, 
and organisation skills, respectively, which all go beyond intuitive and implicit 
recognitional ability.  Some of the exemplars provided by Benner (1984) also clearly 
indicate that nurses have a great deal of explicit knowledge, and that they use it (for 
example, see Benner, 1984, pp. 124-125, and 128).  Finally, the emphasis on implicit 
knowledge at the expert stage raises a paradox—if knowledge is intuitive, perceptual, 
and ineffable, some of the methodology used by Benner and her colleagues (in 
particular narrative interviews in small groups of nurses) does not seem the most 
appropriate, as it uses a channel of communication that is essentially limited to the 
verbal modality. 
The abstract-concrete dimension does not stand empirical scrutiny either.  The 
theory emphasizes that expertise is characterized by a decrease of abstract thought 
parallel to an increase of concrete thought.  Although this may be true in some 
domains, there are also many domains where this is not the case.  A classic example is 
physics, where experts, contrary to the prediction, solve problems employing deep 
and abstract constructs, while novices solve them at a superficial and concrete level 
                                                 
1
 The page numbers refer to the 2001 edition of the book. 
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(Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, Mc Dermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980).  In 
nursing, Benner (1984) provides a few exemplars that clearly indicate the importance 
of abstract theoretical knowledge (e.g., pp. 116-117). 
Benner and her colleagues, based on previous work by the Dreyfus brothers 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus, 1965), strongly argue that intuition and holistic 
perception are necessary for performing at expert level.  However, by doing so, they 
underestimate the role played by analytic and conscious problem solving at the expert 
level.  For example, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, pp. 31-32) state that, “while most 
expert performance is ongoing and nonreflective, when time permits and outcomes 
are crucial, an expert will deliberate before acting. But […] this deliberation does not 
require calculative problem solving, but rather involves critically reflecting on one’s 
intuitions”.  In support of this view, they cite an informal experiment where a chess 
international master was able to maintain a good level in spite of having to carry out 
an interfering task (adding dictated numbers).  Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) conclude 
that, although adding numbers interfered with his ability to carry out search and 
construct plans, this player was still able to produce the fluent and integrated play that 
is typical of expert level.  We do agree that pattern recognition plays an important role 
in chess, and that limiting thinking time affects the quality of play less than would be 
the case if search and analytic thinking were the only ingredients of skill.  However, 
empirical results also show that limiting thinking time does affect performance (Gobet 
& Simon, 1996a).  In addition, well-controlled experiments using interfering tasks 
similar to that described by Dreyfus and Dreyfus have shown that the quality of play 
is substantially impaired (Robbins et al., 1995).  Thus, the information provided by 
rapid perceptual recognition must be seconded by other thinking mechanisms that 
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appear to be analytic in nature—for example, in chess, generating sequences of moves 
and evaluating them. 
Benner (1984) does mention the necessity for experts to use analytic thinking 
in some circumstances, for example when there was no previous experience with the 
situation, or when intuitions were wrong.  But, in these cases, she does not provide 
any explanation of how holistic intuition can be combined with analytic thinking.  
This is a regrettable omission, as it is well established empirically that, in many 
domains, expert decision-making is made possible by a combination of rapid 
perception and slower problem solving (Gobet, 1997; Klein, 1998; Prietula & Simon, 
1989). In the literature on decision making in nursing, Cader, Campbell, and Watson 
(2005), who use as framework Hammond’s (1987) cognitive continuum theory, 
discuss how humans alternate between an intuitive and analytical mode of processing 
depending on whether the task is ill-structured or well-structured. 
Finally, although we agree with the importance of perception and pattern 
recognition in intuition and expertise, we believe that current evidence from 
neuroscience does not support the notion that pattern recognition is holistic.  The bulk 
of the evidence seems to support the hypothesis that perception proceeds sequentially 
engaging specialized modules (Eimer, 2000; O’Rourke & Holcomb, 2002), which 
must count against holistic processing. 
To summarize, Benner’s theory is too simple to account for the complex 
pattern of phenomena linked to expert intuition in nursing.  In the following sections, 
we present a recent theory of expertise and show how, with minor extensions, it can 
offer a good explanation of both the phenomena explained by Benner’s theory and 
those that are beyond its scope. 
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A Template Theory of Expert Intuition 
The introduction has indicated the features that must be explained by a theory 
of expert intuition.  It should account for the suddenness and perceptual nature of 
intuition, its holistic character, as well as the lack of awareness of the processes 
involved.  It should also provide mechanisms explaining how emotions relate to 
intuition, and how, at least with experts, intuitions lead to decisions that are generally 
suitable.  We develop such a theory, using as a starting point the template theory 
(TempT) proposed by Gobet and Simon (1996b; 2000). 
In line with previous theories of expertise, such as the chunking theory (Simon 
& Chase, 1973), a key assumption of TempT is that experts are hampered by the same 
cognitive limits as novices.  For example, attention can be focused to only one thing 
at a time, and visual short-term memory is limited to just four items.  Similarly, it is 
proposed that experts and novices essentially use the same problem-solving methods; 
these methods include means-end analysis, progressive deepening, and heuristics that 
limit the number of situations to search.  To improve to the point that they become 
experts, novices have to learn a large number of perceptual patterns, known as chunks 
(Simon & Chase, 1973).  For example, this enables stronger chess players to perceive 
the board as chunks of pieces, and not as individual pieces.  These chunks are both 
units of perception and meaning, and can be built recursively.  Data from chess 
(Gobet & Clarkson, 2004; Simon & Chase, 1973) provide strong evidence for the 
psychological reality of chunks; for example, it has been shown that different ways of 
defining chunks, either using the latencies in replacing pieces on the board or the 
pattern of relations between the replaced pieces, yield essentially the same results.  
Some patterns that recur often in the environment may lead to the construction 
not only of chunks, but also of more complex data structures known as templates.  
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Templates possess both a “core,” which encodes stable information, and “slots,” 
which encode variable information.  Templates are thus similar to the schemata 
proposed by Bartlett (1932) and Minsky (1975).  However, an important difference is 
that, while previous schema theories were rather vague as to how schemata are 
acquired, template theory proposes detailed mechanisms for the acquisition of 
templates (see Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003, for details).  Both 
chunks and templates may be linked by “similarity links” if they share enough 
elements.  Learning a new chunk is relatively slow (about 8 seconds), but information 
can be stored rapidly in a slot (about 250 milliseconds).  The construction of chunks, 
templates, and similarity links is not unique to expertise, but engages basic 
mechanisms that are used in other domains, such as verbal learning, concept 
formation, and acquisition of language (Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Lane, 2005; Gobet et 
al., 2001). 
 Chunks and templates can be associated with long-term memory information.  
In particular, they can be associated with possible actions, forming what Newell and 
Simon (1972) call “productions.” For example, a chess player may learn that, given an 
open line, a rook should control this line.  Thus, according to TempT, expertise is 
made possible by the acquisition of a large number of chunks and templates that are 
linked to possible actions.  Amongst these actions are instructions of where attention 
should be directed next, that is, where the next eye fixation should land (De Groot & 
Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Lane, 2005).  In other words, the knowledge acquired through 
experience within a domain determines where attention will be focused and thus what 
will be perceived.  Conversely, what is being perceived determines what will be 
learned.  
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 Aspects of the theory have been implemented as computer programs.  The 
simulations have centred on chess, as it is the domain of expertise where most data are 
available.  The CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures) program has 
closely simulated several phenomena related to novice, intermediate, and expert 
perception and memory.  These include the detail of eye movements during the brief 
presentation of a position; how players memorize positions that have been briefly 
presented; how the structure of the position affects recall (for example, how recall of 
game positions compares to the recall of positions randomised in various ways); the 
effect of presentation time, ranging from 1 second to 60 seconds, on recall; and how 
novices acquire chunks and templates as a function of practice (De Groot & Gobet, 
1996; Gobet & Jackson, 2002; Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003).  
Another computational model, called SEARCH, provides mechanisms showing how 
pattern recognition and search interact during look-ahead search (Gobet, 1997).  This 
program makes a number of predictions about how problem solving variables, 
including average depth of search and rate of search, change as a function of skill.  
While developed primarily on chess data, the theory is general and explains the 
development of expertise in domains such as science, engineering, and sports (Gobet 
et al., 2001; Simon & Gobet, 2000).  
 Whether the template theory can explain the phenomenon of expert intuition 
in nursing is an important theoretical question with serious practical implications, for 
example for training.  In particular, it is far from obvious that mechanisms developed 
for explaining chess and scientific expertise are suitable for nursing, where human 
relations and emotions play a much larger role. 
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Applying Template Theory to Expert Intuition in Nursing 
In the introduction of this article, we mentioned a definition of expert intuition 
comprising five key features.  We first show how TempT mechanisms account for 
these features, focusing on the domain of nursing practice, before providing a direct 
comparison of Benner’s theory and TempT. 
Rapid Perception 
The perceptual nature of intuition is explained by pattern recognition.  Chunks 
and templates, which have been honed during concrete practice in a domain, play here 
the key role in enabling relevant long-term memory information to be accessed 
rapidly.  When chunks and templates give access to a relevant link in long-term 
memory, a production is fired.  In other words, a pattern similar to one met during 
previous experience is recognized, and thus an action, possibly a solution to the 
problem at hand, is automatically elicited.2  During the early stages of expertise, this 
solution could be obtained only through instruction or slow, explicit problem solving 
mechanisms; with experts, it can be accessed automatically through memory lookup.  
This mechanism is similar to that proposed by Simon in several publications (Simon, 
1969; Simon, 1995; Simon & Chase, 1973).  To some extent, intuition is just one 
heuristic among others to cope with the complexity of the search space.  We make it 
clear that, while the pair pattern-action can be considered as a (micro-) rule, it is not a 
                                                 
2
  Benner and Tanner (1987) criticize cognitive models as failing to capture the 
fuzziness and ambiguity of real situations.  However, this criticism does not apply to 
the class of models discussed here, which not only can deal with noisy and imperfect 
perceptual inputs, but also improve their behaviour as a function of learning.  See De 
Groot and Gobet (1996) for a detailed discussion. 
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direct and truthful implementation of whatever explicit rule was used during non-
intuitive problem solving.3  Rather, it is a rule that has been contextualized by adding 
concrete information about the problem, both on the side of the perceptual pattern 
(e.g., what is the shade of the patient’s skin?) and on the side of the action to carry out 
(e.g., what is the precise timing of the intervention to carry out?). 
Lack of Awareness of the Processes Engaged 
According to TempT, the mechanisms enabling the access to long-term 
memory are unconscious; only the end product of recognition, which is placed in 
short-term memory, is conscious (see also Ericsson & Simon, 1993).  Conscious 
thought can affect pattern recognition through attention: directing one’s gaze to a 
specific part of the visual scene, perhaps to fulfil a given goal, will lead to the 
recognition of slightly different patterns than if another part is fixed. 
Holistic Understanding of the Situation 
A weakness of earlier theories based on chunking, such as that proposed by 
Simon and Chase (1973), was that they assumed that chunks were relatively small (at 
most five to six pieces with chess).  As a consequence, they had difficulty in 
                                                 
3
 The literature on nursing intuition (e.g., Benner et al., 1996; Darbyshire, 1994; 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) sometimes considers that all cognitive psychologists reject 
the role of intuition en bloc and propose that experts use solely rules.  This view is 
simply incorrect, as exemplified for example by Simon and Chase’s (1973) chunking 
theory, which highlights the importance of perception and indeed intuition.  In 
particular, while Simon was interested in the role of rules, goals, plans, and 
representations in human cognition, he also recognized the prominence of intuition, 
acquired through concrete and situated interactions with the environment. 
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explaining the type of holistic understanding of a situation shown by experts in many 
domains such as nursing (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).  The presence of templates, as 
well as mechanisms explaining how templates are acquired, removes this weakness.  
Templates tend to be larger than standard chunks; for example, in the domain of 
chess, a single template could in principle cover the entire position (up to 32 pieces), 
although the templates identified empirically and by computer simulations tend to be 
smaller, storing between 10 and 15 pieces.  In addition to explaining how experts can 
construct a rapid internal representation of the environment and use high-level 
representations (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Freyhoff, Gruber, & Ziegler, 1992), 
templates explain how experts can sometimes rapidly imagine the possible 
development of a situation, what Klein (1998) calls a “mental simulation.”  In the 
domain of nursing practice, Benner (1984) calls this phenomenon “future think.”  A 
mental simulation is made possible by carrying out search using high-level 
representations (templates) and using variable information, rather than using only 
chunks, which are relatively inflexible bits of information (Gobet, 1997).  
Experts’ Intuitions are Normally Correct  
Anybody can rapidly make decisions based on some perceptual feature of the 
situation.  Of course, with most people, the decisions will be of poor quality, and the 
chosen actions at best useless for addressing the issue at hand, and at worst dangerous.  
Instances of advanced beginners’ intuitions can be found in the literature on nursing 
(McCormack, 1993), but it is unclear whether these intuition led to appropriate 
decisions. Nor does the methodology used by Benner and her colleagues (Benner, 
1984; Benner et al., 1996) make it possible to estimate how often decisions based on 
intuitions turn out to be incorrect. 
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To reach de Groot’s criteria that intuitions should be generally correct, or at a 
minimum correct more often than chance (De Groot, 1965, 1992), one apparently has 
to be an expert.  That experts’ intuitions are not always correct can be explained by 
assuming that not all relevant features can possibly be learnt, even with years of 
practice; that the environment is changing, so that cues that were useful in the past are 
now misleading; that not all pertinent features can be taken into account, for example 
because of time pressure; and that, in some domains such as clinical diagnosis in 
psychology and prediction of stock markets, the environment offers so few 
regularities that it is simply impossible to extract reliable patterns (e.g., Dawes, 1994; 
Meehl, 1954).  The latter explanation would suggest that nurses working in different 
specialisms (e.g., neonatal care, intensive care units, psychiatry) show different 
propensities to act intuitively. 
Intuitions are Coloured by Emotions 
Several authors have noted that emotions are part and parcel of intuitions 
(Benner, 1984; De Groot, 1965, 1992; King & Appleton, 1997).  The original version 
of TempT does not include mechanisms accounting for emotions, but Chassy and 
Gobet (2005) have recently proposed biological mechanisms showing how emotions 
can be linked to memory in general and, in particular, how they modulate the use of 
chunks and templates.  
There is now strong evidence that cognitions (both simple and complex) can 
be linked to emotional responses (both simple and complex) (LeDoux, 1999; Rolls, 
2003).  Chassy and Gobet (2005) proposed that chunks and templates get associated 
to emotional responses during the activities taking place in the practice and study of a 
domain.  Later, when a chunk or a template is retrieved from long-term memory, it 
may activate one or several emotional responses.  These responses are analysed by an 
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emotional processor that determines which emotional response takes precedence.  The 
emotional processor not only triggers the body changes but also instigates modulation 
of cognitive processing.  It is worth noting that cognitive and emotional modulation is 
submitted to huge personal variability, known as affective style (Davidson & Irwin, 
1999), which may be partly explained by different histories of learning that have been 
crystallised in long-term memory structures.  
Comparison between Benner’s Theory and Template Theory 
The previous section has shown that TempT, with slight additions for dealing 
with emotions, can explain all the central features of expert intuition that we had 
identified in the introduction of this article.  Just like Benner’s theory, TempT is a 
general theory of intuition, with applications not only to nursing, but also to domains 
such as business, chess, and physics.  Indeed, computer simulations have been carried 
out in the latter two domains, showing how chunks and templates—the essential 
components of pattern recognition and thus of intuition—are acquired (Gobet & 
Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003; Lane, Cheng, & Gobet, 2000).  Given the 
claims of generality made by these two theories, it is of considerable interest to 
compare them closely, listing the points of agreement and disagreement.  
Points of Agreement 
A first point of agreement is that the authors of both theories concur that 
intuition is a genuine phenomenon, worth studying.  As noted in the introduction, this 
is not an opinion necessarily shared by all scholars in nursing research.  There is also 
agreement that intuition is characterized by rapid perception, grasp of the situation as 
a whole, lack of awareness of the mechanisms leading to an action, and participation 
of emotions. 
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Both approaches acknowledge the predominant role of perception in expert 
intuition.  In this respect, important questions are how experts know where to look at 
and what are the salient features in a particular situation.  Here, the answer differs 
somewhat.  Benner et al. (1996) reject the idea that internal representations guide 
attention, while these are essential in TempT.  The latter theory proposes that it is 
knowledge that explains how experts perceive key features of a situation rapidly (De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet & Lane, 2005). Novices rely on slower and more error-
prone heuristics for directing their attention.  In the case of nursing, the knowledge 
that experts (unconsciously) use for focusing attention include not only theoretical 
knowledge, but also clinical/practical knowledge acquired through direct interaction 
with patients, as these contextual cues are learnt automatically and unconsciously in 
nurses’ daily activities.  On this last point, the two approaches seem in agreement (see 
for example Benner, 1984;  and Benner et al., 1996).  There is also consensus about 
the necessity of having a variety of examples during learning for enabling a fine 
discrimination of perceptual skills (Benner, 1984; Gobet, 2005).  A final point of 
agreement is that intuition enables rapid selection from alternatives, without 
conscious awareness, although the two approaches diverge somewhat here.  
According to Benner’s theory, the link between conscious problem solving and 
intuition is tenuous for experts: intuition is the way experts make decisions.  By 
contrast, TempT continues the tradition started by De Groot (1965) and Simon (1969) 
and considers that this link is very strong with experts.  In particular, a substantial 
amount of the information used during slow problem solving is accessed by pattern 
recognition, and is thus intuitive in nature.  We believe that the lack of an explicit link 
between pattern recognition and more analytic decision-making processes is currently 
a weakness in Benner’s account of nursing expertise and intuition. 
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Points of Disagreement 
 The research philosophies behind Benner’s theory and TempT differ 
considerably, and it is therefore not surprising that the two approaches are at variance 
on several counts.  TempT approach can be located in standard cognitive science and 
cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on collecting experimental data and 
developing computer models simulating the behaviour under study.  Benner’s 
approach is based on phenomenology, which precisely challenges the methods of 
traditional science, including the use of experimental data and computer models 
(Benner et al., 1996; Darbyshire, 1994; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986).  In a nutshell, the 
former approach is based on mechanisms, while the latter relies on descriptions.  The 
former emphasizes that the holistic nature of cognition can be explained by local 
mechanisms, the latter challenges this view.   
 These differences in emphasis clearly affect what each approach considers to 
be the best way to carry out empirical research on intuition in nursing and in other 
domains.  The TempT approach calls for experimental data to be collected—not only 
descriptive data such as narratives.  To the objection that this is not possible, we reply 
that such data have been collected in other domains, and that phenomenologists do not 
always reject experimental data.  For example, Dreyfus (1996) refers to studies using 
Air Force instructors’ eye-movement recordings during simulated flight to refute the 
hypothesis that experts follow rules.  A similar reticence to use experimental methods 
can be observed when it comes to the study of care.  Benner (1984, p. 171) has argued 
that, “to examine ‘care,’ we cannot rely on purely quantitative, experimental 
measurements based on the natural science model.”  However, research within the 
framework of Rogerian theory, focusing on humanist person-centered therapy and 
empathy, shows that topics such as care can be studied with rigorous quantitative 
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methodology (Rogers, 1961).  We suggest that a combination of “soft” and “hard” 
methods should be used to study these questions, to the benefit of all parties.  For 
example, to what extent do commitment and care impact on intuition by directing 
attention and increasing motivation, and can this be captured in a formal model?  
Additional Issues 
It is unfortunate that research into nursing intuition and expertise is isolated 
from similar research in other fields.  For example, Benner et al. (1996) do not refer to 
any of the extensive studies on expertise in psychology (for overviews, see Chi et al., 
1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991).  This is particularly regrettable with respect to 
medical expertise, as several themes have been studied in both fields, such as the 
developmental stages between novice and expert, the role of perception in expertise, 
and the difficulties in integrating theoretical/biomedical and clinical knowledge 
(Norman et al., 1992; Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990).  
 Although its importance is acknowledged by both theories, the role of 
individual differences in the development of intuition has been barely touched upon in 
scientific research.  Empirical evidence suggests that some students are more inclined 
than others to use intuitive understanding (McCormack, 1993).  De Groot (1992) has 
called for research being carried out on this question, and nursing seems an ideal 
domain for such an endeavour.  
 A final issue that warrants attention, as noted by Paley (1996), concerns cases 
where intuition is counter-productive, perhaps because it invites experts to choose 
sub-optimal solutions.  Saariluoma (1992) as well as Bilalić, McLeod, and Gobet (in 
press) have shown that such situations can be induced experimentally in chess.  
Studying this question in nursing could help obtain a deeper understanding of 
intuition. 
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Implications for Education 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the implications of the 
two theories on nursing education and practice.  We limit ourselves to a few remarks 
about education.  In spite of important differences in their focus, both theories share a 
number a features that are important for designing education and training 
programmes: the role of perception (e.g., the importance of being able to discriminate 
between subtle perceptual differences), the importance of acquiring skills in situ, and 
the importance of taking individual differences into account.  However, there are also 
clear differences in emphasis.  Benner (1984) recommends that analytical and abstract 
methods should be taught to beginners, but not at later stages, where instruction 
should focus on developing intuitive skills though direct interaction with concrete 
examples of patients.  According to TempT, domain-specific analytic methods are 
also important at later stages of learning (including expert level), and thus should be 
taught at all skill levels.     
More critically, Benner’s theory emphasises holistic understanding, which in 
her definition means that such understanding cannot be decomposed into smaller 
parts. TempT suggests a different approach: while it acknowledges the importance of 
understanding a patient as a whole, it also proposes that this whole is decomposable 
into parts and their relations.  Thus, in principle, instructional methods can be 
developed for teaching these components incrementally (Gobet, 2005).  A related 
implication is that TempT proposes—unlike Benner’s theory—that human knowledge 
can be approximated as chunks and templates, and that instructional methods can be 
developed to foster the acquisition of these knowledge structures (Gobet & Wood, 
1999). Another implication is that analysis can identify efficient ways in which these 
elements can be taught in the curriculum. The use of patient narratives, which is seen 
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as essential in Benner’s approach, does not play such an important role within the 
framework of TempT; narratives may offer valuable cases studies, but may be 
replaced by other methods less based on phenomenology. Thus, while agreeing that 
“expertise takes time to develop”, we disagree that “it is neither cost-effective nor 
practical to try to ‘teach’ it in formal educational programs” (Benner, 1984, p. 184). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have briefly reviewed evidence on intuition in nursing 
practice, and then discussed Benner’s (1984) influential theory at some length.  
Although the theory has strengths, we have also argued that it suffers from a number 
of weaknesses.  This has led us to consider Gobet and Simon’s (2000) theory of 
expertise as an alternative explanatory framework. We have argued that TempT, 
which is a general theory of expertise, accounts for the key features of intuition, both 
with nursing and other domains.  We have also identified a regrettable methodological 
chasm between the two approaches.  Our approach, which continues the tradition of 
“standard” research on expertise started by De Groot, is based on the natural sciences; 
Benner’s approach, continuing the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, is based on 
phenomenology.  While the different scientific philosophies make it hard for the two 
sides to communicate, the benefits of such a dialogue would be considerable and 
would include new research questions and methods. 
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